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Power of rapporteurs in a changing institutional setting
The Gebhardt report on the Services Directive, the Sacconi 
report  on  REACH  (regulation  on  chemical  products),  the 
Gauzès report on alternative investment (hedge) funds, the 
El Khadraoui report on the Eurovignette, the Estrela report 
on  parental  leave,  or  the  Száyer  report  on  the  power  of 
legislative delegation. These reports are exemplary of two 
important aspects of EU decision-making: First, introduced 
in 1993, the so-called co-decision procedure has emerged 
as  the  dominant  policy-making  procedure  in  Brussels. 
Especially with Amsterdam (1999), its adjusted procedure 
extended  its  applicability  considerably.  The  number  of   
co-decision reports has been multiplied by sixteen between 
the fourth (1994-1999: 30) and sixth legislative terms (2004-
2009: 477). With new policy areas such as agriculture, police 
and judicial cooperation on criminal matters added by the   
Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1st December 
2009,  the  co-decision  procedure  has  also  officially  been 
turned into the ordinary legislative procedure of EU policy-
making. 
  The  second  important  aspect  relates  to  the  European 
Parliament  (EP),  the  European  co-legislator  under  the   
co-decision procedure. With a growing dominance of the 
co-decision procedure, not only the EP’s overall role in EU 
policy-making is strengthened (Häge and Kaeding, 2007), 
but especially a distinct and small group of actors within the 
EP has gained considerable powers. This group is composed 
of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), 
who are ‘the most powerful of parliamentarians in terms of 
influencing the content of legislative outcomes’ (Benedetto, 
2005:85; see also Ringe, 2009), so-called rapporteurs.  
Where are the MEPs from 
the accession countries?  
Rapporteurship assignments in 
the European Parliament after 
Enlargement 
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This  article  seeks  to  identify  factors  that  influence  the  chances  of  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament (MEPs) becoming rapporteurs. More specifically, it attempts to answer the question of 
how MEPs from the accession countries were integrated into the report allocation process, which is 
crucial for EU legislative decision-making. Drawing on extended data from the last three legislative 
terms  (1994-2009),  the  results  confirm  and  challenge  existing  knowledge.  First,  the  allocation 
of rapporteurship does not mirror the composition of the full plenary, but points towards strong   
under-representation of certain national delegations. Most important is the virtual absence of 
MEPs from the accession countries. Representing 22% of the full plenary, they reported on only 
9% of all co-decision procedures concluded in the first legislative term after the 2004 enlargement.   
This pattern of under-representation is evident even when comparing the figures with first-time 
MEPs form the longer-standing Member States.
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?Rapporteurs  –  among  the  most  powerful  legislative 
entrepreneurs in EU policy-making
Rapporteurs  are  normally  to  be  found  in  parliamentary 
committees, where much of the detailed legislative work of 
the EP is carried out. They are fully responsible for drafting 
the committee’s report and for following the proposal from 
the beginning to the very end. Rapporteurs monitor the 
progress  of  the  EP’s  opinion  on  a  European  Commission 
(Commission) proposal; are among the members expected 
to  table  compromise  amendments;  propose  that  a  vote 
is postponed based on the legal status of a Commission 
proposal  or  on  the  Commission  rejecting  amendments 
tabled  in  advance  of  the  vote,  and,  eventually,  make 
recommendations  for  a  vote.  In  order  to  carry  out  this 
demanding  legislative  work,  rapporteurs  have  a  set  of 
instruments  at  their  disposal. 
They are provided with exclusive 
access to resources unavailable to 
other MEPs (Kaeding 2005). They 
enjoy a priority to speak (along 
with leaders of political groups); 
may  speak  more  than  other 
members; are the only members 
allowed  to  speak  during  a  Plenary  vote,  to  outline  their 
committee’s  position  on  amendments;  may  speak  when 
a  proposal  or  motion  is  considered  without  amendment 
and  debate;  may  be  heard  under  an  urgent  procedure; 
and may speak before a procedural motion (Corbett et al. 
2005: 133). To put it differently, who is being selected as 
rapporteur determines ‘the range of political opinions that 
are  represented  in  the  policy  positions  of  the  European 
Parliament’ (Hausemer 2006: 512).
Legislative  role  of  rapporteurs  correlates  with  steady 
growth in use of informal trialogues 
In addition to the rapporteurs’ increasing formal powers, 
informal changes to the EU decision-making architecture 
have  further  strengthened  their  legislative  weight. 
Systematically  introduced  by  the  stakeholders,  so-called 
informal  trialogues  have  forged  more  and  more  early 
reading  agreements  over  the  last  years,  i.e.  1st  reading 
agreements and so-called ‘early second reading deals’.
As  table  1  displays,  first  reading  agreements  have 
considerably increased over the last 15 years. Starting from 
19% of all dossiers concluded between 1999- 2000, almost 
three-quarters  (75%)  of  all  dossiers  between  2004-2009 
were adopted in first reading. In addition, the data shows 
that 11% of all co-decision files in 2004-2009 were adopted 
at  ‘early  second  reading’.  This  means  that  the  Council’s 
position is approved by the EP because it has negotiated 
it with the Council in the phase between the 1st reading in 
the EP and the Council’s adoption of its common position. 
These  negotiations  are  then  formalised  by  a  letter  from 
the chair of the responsible committee to the president of 
COREPER  indicating  a ‘recommendation  to  the  plenary  to 
accept the Council common position without amendment.’ 
While, formally speaking, procedures concluded in this way 
are concluded at second reading stage, in reality a political 
agreement  has  already  been  reached  before  the  Council 
completes its first reading (see also Farrell and Héritier, 2004). 
  This has, amongst other things,1 concrete implications for 
the role of rapporteurs, who negotiate on behalf of the EP in 
this increasing number of informal trialogues. These informal 
arrangements empower rapporteurs considerably, because 
EP committees and plenary sessions (where all party groups 
and  MEPs  are  represented)  are 
not  allowed  to  change  a  ‘dot 
or  comma’  of  the  ‘compromise’ 
position  agreed  in  informal 
trialogue  meetings  (Rasmussen 
and  Shackleton,  2005).  The  EP 
negotiators are tied in a deal to 
deliver the votes to push through 
the deal agreed in informal negotiations, which makes them 
very influential. Who are these rapporteurs? How are they 
selected?
  Curiously,  knowledge  about  this  group  of  ‘legislative 
entrepreneurs’  is  relatively  scarce.  We  only  know  that 
rapporteurs are selected based upon an obscure ‘auction-
like’  system  which  has  not  guaranteed  a  proportional 
distribution of reports (Kaeding, 2004; Hoyland, 2006). But 
do these findings still hold after the 2004 enlargement? What 
effect has enlargement had on the distribution of powerful 
positions,  such  as  rapporteurships,  within  the  EP?  What 
roles have MEPs from the accession countries played over 
the last five years? Our data hints at serious shortcomings 
with regard to the distribution of reports, particularly for 
MEPs from the accession countries. 
What determines the selection of rapporteurs?
Whereas  the  composition  of  the  committees  and  the 
selection of the office holders are regulated in the standing 
orders of the EP, the allocation of rapporteurships within 
committees is not. Instead, party groups have developed an 
auction-like system– an ‘obscure and complicated’ bidding 
system  between  party  groups  and  coordinators.  As  Ken 
Collins,  former  chairman  of  the  Environment  Committee, 
noted  in  an  interview,  the  selection  of  rapporteurs  is ‘a 
combination of a kind of auction, and a kind of elaborate 
game of poker’.
Rapporteurs: Information 
provider  or  preference 
outlier?
Experts  see  the  assign-
ment  of  rapporteurs 
driven by different logics: 
distribution  or  informa-
tion.  On  the  one  hand, 
the  allocation  of  reports 
is considered to be a self-
selection  process  where 
members  of  parliament 
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Table 1: 
Number of co-decision dossiers from 1994-2009 broken down by number of readings
Source: European Parliament. * Out of which 11% early 2nd reading agreements
Time period Total co-decision Dossiers 
concluded at 1st 
reading
Dossiers 
concluded at 2nd 
reading
Dossiers 
concluded at 3rd 
reading
Total 1994-1999 30 -- 18 (60%) 12 (40%)
Total 1999-2004 403 115 (29%) 200 (50%) 88 (22%)
Total 2004-2009 477 340 (72%) 107 (23%)* 23 (  5%)
Informal changes to the 
EU decision-making architecture 
have strengthened the legislative 
weight of rapporteursseek reports that reflect their particular interests (concept 
of  demanding  rapporteurs).  Accordingly,  the  group  of 
rapporteurs  tends  to  consist  of  policy  outliers;  members 
with a high demand for the policies in their jurisdiction. On 
the  other  hand,  one  could  foresee  a  preponderance  of  a 
non-outlier group of rapporteurs that is a ‘microcosm of the 
house’. According to this concept of informative rapporteurs, 
the underlying logic is information. In other words, the group 
of rapporteurs is composed of ‘natural’ adversaries, specialists 
with  heterogeneous  preferences  representing  both  sides 
of  the  policy  spectrum  in  order  to  guarantee  that  critical 
information is signalled to the full plenary. 
A selection bias in the European Parliament
Drawing on data from the fourth, fifth and sixth legislative 
terms  (1994-2009)2  covering  the  eight  most  important 
legislative  parliamentary  committees3,  the  results  show 
that the group of rapporteurs is predominantly composed 
of policy outliers. The national origin of an MEP increases 
or decreases respectively the probability of rapporteurship 
assignment  in  the  EP.  In  other  words,  the  group  of 
rapporteurs  does  not  mirror  the  overall  distribution  of 
seats across national delegations in the full plenary. From a 
long term perspective, data even hints at shifts in selection 
patterns in favour of certain national delegations.
  Most  important,  however,  is  the  ‘virtual  absence’  of 
MEPs  from  the  accession  countries.  Representing  22%  of 
the full plenary, they reported on only 9% of all co-decision 
procedures  concluded  in  the  first  legislative  term  after 
the  2004  enlargement.  Note  that  Estonian  and  Maltese 
parliamentarians did not draft any co-decision reports. 
Some Member States are more equal...
Nationality has been a strong determinant of rapporteurship 
assignment over the last fifteen years. For example, in the 
Environment  Committee,  one  of  the  more  prestigious 
committees with the second highest number of members 
and the highest output with 31% of all co-decision dossiers 
adopted in 2004-2009, data shows the following pattern: 
coming  from  a  green-minded  Member  State  like  Austria, 
Germany,  Sweden,  Luxembourg  or  the  Netherlands,  for 
example,  increases  the  probability  of  being  assigned 
rapporteur in the Environment Committee on average by 
0.49. In other words, in the Environment Committee, there 
is a 50% higher chance to be appointed rapporteur for MEPs 
from green-minded Member States.
  Table 2 illustrates that our findings are more nuanced. 
Some Member States, mostly so-called ‘laggards’ in the field 
of environmental policy, have become more passive over the 
years, whereas some, green-minded Member States, further 
strengthened their involvement in daily EU policy-making. 
Comparing the proportional share of seats of Member States 
in the EP Environment Committee relative to the number 
of reports in (+/-) percentage (1994-2009), Austria (+5), the 
Netherlands (+5) and Germany (+12) in particular increased 
their involvement considerably. Portugal, Italy and Spain, on 
the other hand, have fallen into almost total lethargy. 
  Next to these policy specific selection patterns (see also 
Kaeding, 2005), our data for the eight most active legislative 
committees  from  1994-2009  displays  that  one  particular 
bias holds across almost all policy areas: while Italian MEPs 
seem to be almost absent in parliamentary work (with a few 
exceptions such as in the Transport Committee), German 
MEPs appear to be the most active rapporteurs. 
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Selection of rapporteurs:
‘The choice of rapporteurs and draftsmen is normally decided upon within individual committees by a system whose broad  
lines are common to all committees. Each political group receives a quota of points according to its size. Reports and opinions to  
be distributed are then discussed by the committee coordinators who decide on the number of points each subject is worth,  
and then make bids on behalf of their group, the strength of their claim being based in theory (but not always in practice) on  
the relationship between the number of points already used by the group and their original quota.’ (Corbett et al. 2005: 117).
Member 
State
Culture, Youth, Education, 
Media and Sport
Industry, (External Trade), 
Research and Energy
Economic and Monetary Affairs Employment and Social Affairs
1994-1999     1999-2004    2004-2009 1994-1999     1999-2004    2004-2009 1994-1999     1999-2004    2004-2009 1994-1999     1999-2004    2004-2009
B +4 +2 -3 +3 -2 -3 +1 -2 +0 0 +1 -3
DK -3 -1 -2 -1 -1 -2 -1 -3 +1 -1 +5 -2
E +5 -2 -7 -3 +4 -4 +2 +11 -1 -6 -6 0
F +4 -3 0 -6 -9 +26 -8 -6 +1 -8 -4 +3
I -9 +4 -10 -5 -9 -7 -8 -8 -7 -6 -4 0
L -1 -1 +10 +1 +11 -1 +1 -2 +5 -1 -1 +3
NL +5 +1 -3 +3 +2 +2 +4 0 -4 +14 +4 +3
A -4 +1 +5 -1 +2 +8 -4 0 +6 -2 -2 -2
P -2 +3 +4 -2 -1 -3 -4 -3 -3 +2 +6 +4
FI -1 0 +5 0 +3 +3 -1 +4 +7 0 -2 -2
S -2 -3 -3 -3 0 -3 +3 0 -3 -1 +2 +14
UK -2 -3 -10 +9 -4 0 -2 +3 +9 +1 +5 -3
D +4 +4 +19 +7 +6 +6 +16 +5 +5 +11 -2 -6
GR +3 0 +14 -1 0 -3 -1 +1 0 -3 -1 +4
IE +2 -2 -2 0 -2 +1 0 +1 -2 -1 -1 +2
Table 2: Comparison between proportional share of seats of national delegations in EP relative to their total number of reports 
in (+/-) percentage 1994-2009 (part 1)  What  about  the  MEPs  from  the  accession  countries? 
Apparently, the active involvement of MEPs representing the 
accession countries has been almost non-existent (with few 
exceptions). In the Environment Committee (2004-2009) they 
were only selected rapporteurs in 10 out of the 140 reports 
(7%). As table 3 indicates, only the Slovak Republic, Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia reported on Commission 
proposals  -  the  other  six  accession  countries  (Estonia, 
Lithuania,  Latvia,  Malta,  Poland  and  Cyprus)  reported  on 
none. This does not correlate with their overall 22% share of 
seats in the full plenary.
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Member 
State
Consumer and Environment Transport, 
(Regional Policy and  Tourism)
Legal Affairs and 
Internal Market
Civil Liberties
1994-1999     1999-2004    2004-2009 1994-1999     1999-2004    2004-2009 1994-1999     1999-2004    2004-2009 1994-1999     1999-2004    2004-2009
B +3 -1 +2 -3 1 -3 -3 1 -3 +2
DK -3 -2 0 -3 -3 -2 -3 -3 -2 -2
E +1 -4 -5 +13 +3 -5 +13 +3 -5 -7
F -9 -7 0 -3 -7 -7 -3 -7 -7 -5
I -10 -6 -2 -5 +7 +10 -5 +7 +10 -2
L -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
NL +7 +5 +5 -2 -2 -1 -2 -2 -1 -1
A -3 -2 +5 0 -1 -2 0 -1 -2 -2
P -2 -4 -3 -4 -3 -3 -4 -3 -3 +8
FI +10 +3 +1 +1 -3 +1 +1 -3 +1 +1
S +5 +12 +3 -2 -3 -2 -2 -3 -2 +8
UK +2 +4 -2 -8 +11 +14 -8 +11 +14 +12
D 0 0 +12 +15 +7 +5 +15 +7 +5 +1
GR 0 +2 0 0 -3 -3 0 -3 -3 -3
IE 0 +1 +3 +1 -2 -2 +1 -2 -2 -2
EU 10 (6th term 2004-2009)
Consumer and 
Environment
Transport,  
(Regional 
Policy and 
Tourism)
Legal Affairs 
and
Internal 
Market
Culture, 
Youth, Educa-
tion, Media 
and Sport
Industry, (Ex-
ternal Trade), 
Research and 
Energy
Economic and 
Monetary 
Affairs
Employment 
and Social 
Affairs
Civil Liberties
CZ 0 0 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3 -3
EE -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
LV -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 -1 -1
LT -2 +4 -2 -2 -2 _2 +2 +1
HU -2 -3 +15 0 +2 -2 +4 -3
MT -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
PO -7 -3 +3 -7 -1 -7 -7 +1
SL 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +2
SK 0 -2 -2 +5 -2 -2 -2 +1
CY -1 -2 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +2
Table 2: Comparison between proportional share of seats of national delegations in EP relative to their total number of reports 
in (+/-) percentage 1994-2009 (part 2)
Table 3: Proportional share of seats of Member States relative to the number of reports in (+/-) percentage
European Parliament, Brussels
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First-timers vs first-timers
In order to substantiate this claim of underrepresentation, 
we go one step further. We compare MEPs from the accession 
countries, who were first-timers by definition in the sixth EP 
with first-timers from the longer-standing Member States. 
The results in table 4 confirm, however, the nationality bias.
Note:  In  order  to  make  the  figures  comparable,  this  table  only 
includes the first-time MEPs who served the entire sixth legislative 
term (2004-2009). Romanian and Bulgarian MEPs are excluded for 
this reason.
  Table 4 illustrates how the chances to obtain a report 
were  distributed  across  first-timers  from  the  ‘new  and 
old  Member  States’.  Half  of  the  197  first-timers  from  the 
long-standing Member States were allocated at least one   
co-decision, assent or consultation 
report  during  the  sixth  EP  term. 
However, only a third of the 148 
first-timers  from  the  accession 
countries managed to be allocated 
a report. This clearly supports the 
findings from the previous section 
that  the  chances  of  becoming 
rapporteur in the sixth term were 
significantly lower for MEPs from the accession countries 
than  for  MEPs  from  the  long-standing  Member  States. 
Curiously this even remains true when we hold seniority 
constant and consider only MEPs who served for exactly 
the same time period. First-timers from the ‘old’ Member 
States  were  clearly  advantaged  in  the  report  allocation 
process  when  compared  with  their  colleagues  from  the 
accession countries.
Discussion
Enlargement  has  had  almost  no  effect  on  the  micro-
management  of  the  European  Parliament  (EP).  MEPs 
representing the accession Member States have been almost 
absent in the allocation process for committee reports. This 
pattern appears across all powerful legislative committees of 
the EP. Comparing the proportional share of seats of Member 
States in the EP relative to the number of reports, we see that 
‘fresh input from the East’ is lacking. Representing 22% of 
the full plenary, the new MEPs from the accession countries 
reported on only 9% of all co-decision procedures concluded 
between 2004-2009. Two Member States (Estonia and Malta), 
until now, have not even submitted one single co-decision 
report  within  the  last  five  years.  Poland,  Hungary,  Slovak 
Republic  and  the  remaining  two  Baltic  States  (Lithuania 
and Latvia) have only recently started to get involved, albeit 
selectively. This  almost ‘non-existence’  of  rapporteurs  from 
the accession countries could clearly question the integration 
efforts of the EP over the last five years. 
  Focusing on the last three legislative terms of the European 
Parliament (1994- 2009), another finding is striking: a strong 
bias towards a few Member States. In terms of rapporteurship 
assignment, some Member States (France and Finland) have 
caught  up  recently,  while  others  have  become  less  active 
(Spain)  or  almost  invisible,  falling  into  near  total  lethargy 
(Italy). Only one Member State has embellished systematically 
on a grand scale its lead in rapporteurship assignments over 
the last twelve years: Germany. Combining this finding with 
evidence that the EP’s positions are significantly closer to the 
positions of the rapporteurs’ home 
countries (Costello and Thomson, 
2007), we might just have paved 
the way for further research in the 
field. 
  All in all, our findings imply 
that  the  group  of  rapporteurs  is 
clearly  no  microcosm  of  the  full 
plenary,  but  that  the  allocation 
of  reports  appears  to  be  a  self-
selection process where MEPs seek reports that reflect their 
particular interests. This is astonishing if we acknowledge the 
evolving dominance of first reading agreements, the growing 
importance of informal trialogues, both in which rapporteurs 
are the key parliamentary negotiators with essential legislative 
powers.  More  generally,  the  strong  country  biases  in  the 
allocation processes of reports in the EP are even more striking 
in  a  Union  where  proportionality  seems  to  play  such  an 
important role. 
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Co-decision, assent or consultation report allocated?
No Yes Total
Accession 
country?
No 99
(50%)
98
(50%)
197
(100%)
Yes 99
(67%)
49
(33%)
148
(100%)
Total 198
(57%)
147
(43%)
345
(100%)
Table 4: Report Allocation for first-timers under co-decision, 
assent and consultation
The strong country biases in the 
allocation processes of reports 
in the EP are striking in a Union 
where proportionality seems to 
play such an important role. 24
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NOTES
*  Dr  Michael  Kaeding,  Lecturer,  European  Institute  of  Public   
  Administration, EIPA Maastricht
**  Steffen Hurka, M.A. student, University of Constance, Germany.
1  Another implication relates to the lively debate on efficiency 
  vs.  legitimacy  of  EU  governance.  On  the  one  hand  these   
  figures indicate that EP decision-making is efficient and shows   
  ‘the  institution’s  willingness  to  cooperate’.  On  the  other   
  hand, you may want to raise concerns about the transparency of   
  trialogues,  their  undemocratic  nature  and  the  quality  of   
  legislation they produce.
2  The list of MEPs that builds the foundation for this analysis was 
  obtained from Kaeding (2004) and a new website that has just   
  been launched in 2009 (http://www.votewatch.eu). In order to   
  construct  the  dependent  variable,  data  on  report  allocation   
   
  during  the  last  three  EP  terms  were  collected  from  the  EP   
  website,  which  provides  detailed  information  for  every   
  individual MEP. Not all of those MEPs served in the EP for the   
  entire  three  terms.  Some  left  the  EP  before  the  end  of  the   
  legislative periods; others joined it at a later point in time. We   
  controlled for this aspect, since MEPs who did not serve the   
  entire term in the EP must be expected to have a lower a-priori   
  chance of becoming rapporteurs. All MEPs who served a full   
  term had a theoretical chance of attending all plenary meetings   
  and were assigned a value of 1. Please consult the authors for   
  additional information.
3  Environment; Transport; Legal Affairs; Culture and Education; 
  Industry, Research and Energy; Economic and Monetary Affairs;   
  Employment and Social Affairs; Civil Liberties
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